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GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS IN THE 
PHILIPPINES:  CAN EXISTING BIOSAFETY 
REGULATIONS ADEQUATELY PROTECT THE 
ENVIRONMENT? 
Christina L. Richmond† 
Abstract: Global concern persists about the use of genetically modified crops 
(“GM crops”).  This concern originates from the divergent perspectives of nations with a 
stake in either the production or consumption of GM crops.  Proponents of GM crops in 
developing countries claim that the crops could increase food supply by improving plant 
resistance to pesticides, thereby alleviating the need for farmers to purchase chemicals 
that are frequently expensive or unavailable.  However, many organizations and countries 
are hesitant or outright opposed to GM crops, particularly regarding their potentially 
undesirable ecological and agricultural consequences.    
As one of the first Asian nations to approve and commercialize a GM crop, the 
Philippines serves as a useful case study for evaluating a developing nation’s strategy for 
regulating the environmental impacts of agricultural biotechnology in the face of 
international pressures.  Though among the first of the Asian nations to enact biosafety 
regulations, the Philippines’ existing regulations do not adequately protect the 
environment because they lack enforcement power and leave gaps in coverage.  
Legislation that would create a more streamlined regulatory process and endow the 
regulating agencies with stronger enforcement authority should be enacted.   
I. INTRODUCTION 
The application of biotechnology to agricultural crops, a development 
known as “agro-biotechnology,” has been promoted as an innovative 
advance in the worldwide endeavor to improve food security.1  It has 
simultaneously been criticized for its potential to bring about significant 
disruption to the environment.2  A genetically modified (“GM”) crop3 
contains a gene from a different species that gives the crop new traits such as 
                                           
†
 The author would like to thank Professor Sean O’Connor as well as the editors of the Pacific Rim 
Law & Policy Journal for their guidance, suggestions, and assistance in the development of this Comment.   
1
  See, e.g., U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], Policy Issues in Int’l Trade and 
Commodities Study Series No. 29, International Trade in GMO and GM Products: National and 
Multilateral Legal Frameworks, at 1, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITCD/TAB/30, U.N. Sales No. E.04.II.D.41 
(2005) (prepared by Simonetta Zarrilli) [hereinafter UNCTAD GMO Trade Study].   
2
  See, e.g., Miguel A. Altieri, Genetic Engineering in Agriculture: The Myths, Environmental Risks, 
and Alternatives 35-43 (2004). 
3
  Such crops are referred to as GM crops, GE crops, transgenic crops, biotech crops, or simply 
genetically modified organisms (“GMOs”).  All terms refer to the concept in which a crop had been 
modified through biotechnological processes to contain a gene that confers new characteristics.  This 
Comment will use the descriptor “GM crop.”   
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resistance to certain insects or herbicides, increased drought tolerance,4 or 
enhanced nutritional value.5  Supporters of agro-biotechnology argue that it 
could reduce the amounts of pesticide, fertilizer, and water needed to 
produce foods, potentially leading to greater crop yields and improvements 
in food security.6  Critics of the technology warn of potential dangers, 
including threats to the ecosystems in which GM crops are introduced, 
decreased genetic biodiversity of crops, and unknown effects to humans 
from consuming GM foods.7   
The environmental dangers from releasing GM crops have captured 
the world community’s attention.  In particular, scientists and community 
organizations have been concerned that engineered genes8 could escape into 
the environment and be incorporated into the genomes of their wild 
relatives9 through “outcrossing.”10  The impacts of such incorporation could 
lead to the inadvertent evolution of new strains of viruses or pathogenic 
bacteria, as well as the development of herbicide-resistant “superweeds” and 
insecticide-resistant “superbugs.” 11  A separate threat to the environment is 
the possibility that genetic engineering may lead to genetically uniform crop 
systems (monocultures),12 a danger because intra-species genetic diversity is 
important in agriculture.13   
Asia is poised to play a crucial role in determining how widely GM 
crops will be accepted on an international scale.14  As a region, Asia is home 
                                           
4
  WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, TWENTY QUESTIONS ON GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS, 
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/biotech/20questions/en/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2006) 
[hereinafter WHO].  
5
  Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in the Regulation of 
Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167, 2171 (2004). 
6
  See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Biotechnology and International Law, 42 HARV. INT’L L. J. 47, 55 
(2001); Haley Stein, Intellectual Property and Genetically Modified Seeds: The United States, Trade and 
the Developing World, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 160, 175 (2005).   
7
  See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 6, at 56-59; ALTIERI, supra note 2, at ix, 27-33. 
8
  Engineered genes are also known as transgenes. 
9
  Norman C. Ellstrand, Dangerous Liaisons?  When Cultivated Plants Mate With Their Wild 
Relatives 171 (2003). 
10
  See WHO, supra note 4. 
11
  Murphy, supra note 6, at 59. 
12
  Id.  One of the most significant dangers of monocultures is that the crops lack the “necessary 
ecological defense mechanisms” to successfully fight off pests.  Consequently, in order to grow the crop, 
farmers must add agrichemical inputs.  ALTIERI, supra note 2, at xi-xii. 
13
  Clive Stannard et al., Agricultural Biological Diversity for Food Security: Shaping International 
Initiatives to Help Agriculture and the Environment, 48 HOW. L. J. 397, 403-04 (2004). 
14
  See, e.g., Mark McCord, Opinion, Asia Heads Toward Use of GMO Foods Despite Activist 
Protests, THE MANILA TIMES, Aug. 28, 2004; John Feffer, Asia Holds the Key to the Future of GM Food, 
YALEGLOBAL ONLINE, Dec. 2, 2004, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4956 (asserting that Asia 
“holds the key to the future of GM food,” and analogizing that if the decision whether to use GM crops 
were an election, then Asia would be the swing state between the United States and the European Union). 
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to many developing countries struggling to feed their populations.15  Asia 
also currently contains the world’s largest consumer base, is home to the 
greatest number of farmers,16 and is a net grain importer.17  These factors 
combine to create high potential for Asia both as a consumer market18 and as 
a potential agricultural production area.  Many Asian countries have also 
been particularly active in developing and using agro-biotechnology.19   
Within Asia, the Philippines is on the front lines of the agro-
biotechnology movement and was one of the first Asian countries to endorse 
commercialization of GM crops.20  The Philippines has embraced agro-
biotechnology as one method to improve national food security.21  In 2004, 
the Philippines grew 0.1 million hectares of GM crops.22  The International 
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications classifies the 
Philippines as one of fourteen “biotech mega-countries,” which are countries 
that grow 50,000 hectares or more of GM crops annually.23  The Philippine 
population, estimated at 85 million in 2005, is growing rapidly at a rate of 
2.4 % annually.24  This population growth, in combination with the shrinking 
area available for farming,25 has led the Philippines to be a net importer of 
                                           
15
  McCord, supra note 14. 
16
  Feffer, supra note 14. 
17
  Sambit Mohanty, Opinion, Asian Nations May Have To Be Cautious About GMO Rice, MANILA 
TIMES, Oct. 28, 2004.  
18
  See McCord, supra note 14. 
19
  Neil D. Hamilton, Forced Feeding: New Legal Issues in the Biotechnology Policy Debate, 17 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 37, 39 (2005). 
20
  In December 2002, the Philippines approved Monsanto’s application for the commercialization of 
“Bt corn,” which is corn that has been engineered to include genetic material of the Bacillus thuringiensis 
bacteria.  The result is corn that resists the Asiatic corn borer, an insect pest.  See DEP’T OF AGRIC., GMA 
CORN PROGRAM, BT CORN . . . WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW, FACT SHEET (May 2003), available at 
http://www.da.gov.ph/cornprogram/profile/BtCorn/btcorn.html; see also Roderick T. de la Cruz, UNCTAD 
Calls on RP, Other Countries to Balance Impact of GMO, MANILA STANDARD TODAY, May 17, 2005, 
http://www.manilastandardtoday.com/?page=business06_may17_2005. 
21
  See DEP’T OF AGRIC., ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 8, SERIES OF 2002, pmbl. (Apr. 3, 2002), 
available at http://www.da.gov.ph/agrilaws/AO2002/AO_08.html [hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER 
NO. 8] (“WHEREAS, on July 16, 2001 Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo approved the 
Policy Statement on Modern Biotechnology, reiterating the government policy of promoting the safe and 
responsible use of modern biotechnology and its products as one of several means to achieve and sustain 
food security, equitable access to health services, sustainable and safe environment and industry 
development . . . .”). 
22
  Clive James, International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications [ISAAA], 
ISAAA Briefs No. 32, Preview: Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2004, Executive 
Summary, at 4, available at http://www.isaaa.org (follow hyperlink “ISAAA Briefs 34-2005: Global Status 
of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2005”).  
23
  Id. 
24
  Perfecto G. Corpuz  U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Service, Global Agric. Info. Network Report, Philippines 
Biotechnology Annual 2005 (Jul. 25, 2005), http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200506/146130020.pdf. 
25
  Id. 
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grains.26  Adding to the country’s food supply challenges, the average 
Filipino spent about 54% of his or her income on food as of 2002.27  Faced 
with these facts, the government supports agro-biotechnology as a method to 
improve Philippine agricultural productivity.28    
As a heavily agrarian developing nation embracing agro-
biotechnology, the Philippines serves as a useful case study of the challenges 
developing nations must address when regulating agro-biotechnology.  The 
Philippine government encourages the use of biotechnology in a manner that 
enhances the “integrity of the environment” and prevents or reduces risks to 
biological diversity and human health.29  Accordingly, it has developed 
administrative measures regulating the field release of GM crops.  This 
Comment will focus on the environmental impacts of agro-biotechnology, a 
field whose domain intersects with technology, development, food security, 
environmental protection, and international trade agreements.   
The Philippine regulations that seek to protect the nation’s ecosystems 
and agricultural resources from the dangers associated with GM crops lack 
enforcement mechanisms, but could be improved by strengthening 
compliance requirements and implementing a centralized authority to avoid 
regulatory gaps.30  Part II of this Comment details the potential harms posed 
by releasing GM crops into the environment and how regulation of agro-
biotechnology implicates international obligations.  Part III describes 
international and Philippine regulatory schemes regarding the release of GM 
crops into the environment.  Part IV critiques the enforcement and 
compliance mechanisms in Philippine biosafety regulations, and contrasts 
them with both Australia’s more robust enforcement regulatory scheme and 
the gap-ridden United States biotechnology regulatory framework.  Part V 
argues that the Philippines should enact congressional legislation creating a 
more streamlined, centralized regulatory process and providing the 
                                           
26
  Food and Agriculture Organization, Food and Agriculture Indicators: Philippines, FAOSTAT, 
World Bank—World Development Indicators (July 2004), http://www.fao.org/es/ess/compendium_2004/ 
pdf/ESS_PHI.pdf [hereinafter FAO, Food and Agriculture Indicators]. 
27
  Augusto de Leon et al., The Cost Implications of GM Food Labeling in the Philippines: A 
Socioeconomic Impact Study Conducted for the Bureau of Food and Drugs, Feb. 2004, at 80 (on file with 
The Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal). 
28
  See ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 8, supra note 21; Press Release, Office of the President, 
Republic of the Philippines, Lawmakers, Scientists Bat for Legislation on Biotechnology (May 7, 2005), 
http://www.op.gov.ph/news.asp?newsid=9149 [hereinafter Lawmakers, Scientists Bat for Legislation on 
Biotechnology].  
29
  See ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 8, supra note 21, pmbl.; accord Lawmakers, Scientists Bat for 
Legislation on Biotechnology, supra note 28. 
30
  Issues of labeling and the safety of GM foods as consumables for humans and animals are beyond 
the scope of this paper.  For a study of GM food labeling in the Philippines, see de Leon et al., supra note 
27, at 10-11. 
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regulating agencies with stronger enforcement authority.  Such legislation 
would bring the Philippines into compliance with the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety,31 which the Philippine Congress need not formally ratify, as the 
factors for and against doing so balance each other out.  
II. CRITICS OF GM CROPS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACTS OF FIELD RELEASE 
Groups opposed to GM crops cite the potential for harm to the 
environment as one reason not to cultivate GM crops in fields.32  GM crops 
also present developing countries with complicated international trade 
challenges.33 
A. Field Release of GM Crops Triggers Environmental Concerns 
Cultivation of GM crops poses risks to the environment.34  One 
prominent risk is “gene flow,” which is the possibility that the engineered 
genes (“transgenes”) from GM crops might escape and be incorporated into 
wild populations.35  Gene flow is a natural part of evolution and occurs with 
conventional crops36 as well as engineered crops.  However, in the 
biotechnology realm, gene flow refers to the possibility that GM crops will 
hybridize with their wild relatives, resulting in the transfer of the transgenes 
from the GM crops to their wild counterparts.37  For this reason, GM 
organisms have been identified as a potential vector through which “foreign 
and potentially invasive genes may be introduced into a new environment.”38 
                                           
31
  Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 39 
I.L.M. 1027, available at http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/protocol.asp (last visited Mar. 31, 2006) 
[hereinafter Cartagena Protocol]. 
32
  The prospect of detriment to the environment is only one of numerous reasons critics of GM crops 
oppose agro-biotechnology.  However, this Comment focuses on the regulations governing the 
environmental impacts of growing GM crops in the field. 
33
  UNCTAD GMO Trade Study, supra note 1, at 2. 
34
  National Research Council of the National Academies, Biological Confinement of Genetically 
Engineered Organisms 48-49 (2004) [hereinafter National Research Council]. 
35
  Michael P. Healy, Information Based Regulation and International Trade in Genetically Modified 
Agricultural Products: An Evaluation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 9 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
205, 210-12 (2002). 
36
  See ELLSTRAND, supra note 9, at 15-18. 
37
  ELLSTRAND, supra note 9, at 172. 
38
  International Plant Genetic Resources Institute, Issues in Genetic Resources No. 10, International 
Law of Relevance to Plant Genetic Resources: A Practical View for Scientists and Other Professionals 
Working with Plant Genetic Resources 68 (2004) (Susan Bragdon, ed.), available at 
http://www.ipgri.cgiar.org/publications/pubfile.asp?ID_PUB=937 [hereinafter IPGRI].  It should also be 
noted that the rationale for treating GM crops differently stems from the recognition that, while some 
biotechnological processes can bring about genome changes that could have occurred through natural 
mutations or directed breeding but actually occur in one generation rather than hundreds (e.g., improved 
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There are four specific environmental dangers that gene flow may 
produce.39  First, transgenes might confer a competitive benefit to the GM 
crop species’ wild relatives, leading to the evolution of “superweeds” that 
have the potential to disrupt natural ecosystems.40  For example, if a 
transgene that confers pest or herbicide resistance is incorporated into a 
weedy relative of the GM crop, then the transgene would contribute to the 
evolution of increased weediness.41  Second, the possibility exists that 
hybridization between GM crops and their wild relatives will increase the 
risk of extinction among the wild relatives.42  Third, the genetic diversity of 
wild populations may be harmed.43  Finally, the introduction of genetically 
engineered genes could be considered “genetic pollution” of natural 
ecosystem diversity.44  Many of these possible effects of gene flow apply for 
conventionally cultivated agricultural crops,45 but the risks from genetic 
movement have become more pronounced because agro-biotechnology 
introduces genes that otherwise would not exist in plants. 
Other environmental concerns about GM crops are the potential for 
the transgene’s product to affect other organisms in the ecosystem (e.g., 
genetically engineered pesticides that harm non-target insects);46 increased 
use of chemicals in agriculture;47 and the possibility that targeted pests and 
pathogens will evolve resistance to pesticides or diseases.48  A final danger is 
“genetic erosion,” a situation where farmers’ reliance on GM crops results in 
reduced diversity in the gene pool for that species.49  This occurs when the 
ecosystem changes in response to the GM organisms or when farmers limit 
the range of crops they grow.50 
                                                                                                                              
yield or drought-resistance), there are other applications of biotechnology that never could have occurred 
naturally (e.g., resistance to a specific commercial pesticide).  
39
  ELLSTRAND, supra note 9, at 172. 
40
  Id. 
41
  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 49. 
42
  ELLSTRAND, supra note 9, at 172; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 49-50. 
43
  ELLSTRAND, supra note 9, at 172; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 49-50. 
44
  ELLSTRAND, supra note 9, at 172. 
45
  See David J. Schnier, Genetically Modified Organisms & the Cartagena Protocol, 12 FORDHAM 
ENVTL. L.J. 377, 395 (2001); ELLSTRAND, supra note 9, at 172. 
46
  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 49. 
47
  WHO, supra note 4. 
48
  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 49. 
49
  Healy, supra note 35, at 211-12. 
50
  Id.; see also ALTIERI, supra note 2, at 36. 
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B. GM Crops Present Developing Countries with International Trade 
Dilemmas  
Developing nations face difficult choices in setting policy regarding 
GM crops because of their position on the international scene.51  Given the 
ease with which plant materials can cross national boundaries—the common 
example being air-borne pollen—international agreements about the 
movement of plant materials are highly relevant to national decisions about 
the regulation of agro-biotechnology.   
While developed nations create agro-biotechnology policies based on 
domestic concerns (e.g., labeling for GM products stemming from a 
purported “right to know”), developing nations may feel pressure to 
establish “national regulatory schemes based on the requests and 
expectations of their main trade partners.”52  Critics of GM crops assert that 
weak regulatory systems in developing nations allow international 
agribusinesses to promote agro-biotechnology without regard for its 
impacts.53  Within Asia, critics of the agro-biotech industry claim that, in 
general, governments acquiesce to pressure from GM crop exporters despite 
significant popular opposition.54 
Developing nations may also be caught in the middle when their 
trading partners have divergent policies regarding agro-biotechnology.55  For 
example, major GM crop exporters, such as the United States, Canada, and 
Argentina, have authorized most GM products for production and 
consumption.56  In contrast, many European Union countries have adopted a 
“no risk” approach to regulating GM products and impose strict import 
measures that guarantee importing countries maintain a high level of health 
and environmental protection.57  Countries that trade with both the United 
States and the European Union will be forced to alienate one or the other.       
 
                                           
51
  UNCTAD GMO Trade Study, supra note 1, at 2. 
52
  Id. at iii. 
53
  McCord, supra note 14. 
54
  GRAIN, Whither Biosafety?: In These Days of Monsanto Laws, Hope for Real Biosafety Lies at 
the Grassroots, AGAINST THE GRAIN (Oct. 2005), available at http://www.grain.org/articles/?id=9. 
55
  See UNCTAD GMO Trade Study, supra note 1, at 7. 
56
  Id. at 4. 
57
  Id. at 7. 
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III. REGULATING AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY POSES UNIQUE 
CHALLENGES  
International governmental organizations and individual nations face 
unique challenges when determining the most effective approach to regulate 
agro-biotechnology because it is an interdisciplinary issue spanning “trade, 
intellectual property, environment, health, and agriculture.”58  As a catch-all 
issue, GM crops have become increasingly implicated in international trade 
conflicts because in regulating agro-biotechnology, developing nations must 
take into consideration economic development, food security, and 
environmental protection—all against the backdrop of international trade 
agreements.59  The following section describes how international and 
national instruments attempt to regulate the environmental impacts of GM 
crops. 
A. The Two Major International Biosafety Instruments Offer Different 
Approaches to Regulating Agricultural Biotechnology 
The two international treaties that regulate GM crops—the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety60 (“Cartagena Protocol”) and the World Trade 
Organization’s (“WTO”) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”)—reflect different philosophical 
approaches to regulating agro-biotechnology and exemplify the tensions that 
make GM crops a controversial international trade issue.61 
The Cartagena Protocol grew out of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (“CBD”).62  The CBD, which the Philippines has signed and 
ratified,63 is a framework treaty that contains primarily aspirational 
provisions regarding biodiversity.  It includes generalized guidance on the 
handling of biotechnology and the distribution of its benefits, directing the 
parties to develop a protocol outlining procedures for the “safe transfer, 
handling, and the use of any living modified organism resulting from 
biotechnology that may have adverse effect on the conservation and 
                                           
58
  Murphy, supra note 6, at 139. 
59
  UNCTAD GMO Trade Study, supra note 1, at iii. 
60
  Cartagena Protocol, supra note 31. 
61
  The Philippines joined the WTO in 1995.  WTO, Member Information: Philippines and the WTO, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/philippines_e.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2006). 
62
  Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 19, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992), available at 
http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf [hereinafter CBD]. 
63
  Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity/Cartagena Biosafety Protocol, 
http://www.biodiv.org/world/parties.asp (last visited Mar. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Parties to the 
CBD/Cartagena Protocol]. 
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sustainable use of biological diversity.”64  Accordingly, a working group of 
parties to the CBD spent the next several years negotiating such procedures, 
resulting in a final version of the Cartagena Protocol in 2000.65 
The Cartagena Protocol, which entered into force on September 11, 
2003,66 provides a framework for ensuring protection of biological diversity 
and human health from the potential risks posed by the international 
movement and use of living modified organisms (“LMOs”).67  The 
Philippines has signed, but not ratified, the Cartagena Protocol.68   
Two of the key provisions in the Cartagena Protocol are the 
“precautionary principle”69 and the concept of notice and consent through an 
advanced informed agreement.70  The precautionary principle is an emerging 
concept in international law that permits countries to take actions to prevent 
harm to humans or the environment, even in the face of scientific 
uncertainty.71  It reflects “international recognition of the need for and 
legitimacy of applying precaution” in situations of low scientific certainty72 
and places the burden of proving the safety of a new technology on the 
producer of the technology, rather than on critics.73  The advanced informed 
agreement requires exporters to seek consent from an importing country 
before introducing LMOs into the environment.74 
                                           
64
  CBD, supra note 62, art. 19. 
65
  Cartagena Protocol, supra note 31. 
66
  Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Status of Ratification and Entry into Force, 
http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/signinglist.aspx?sts=rtf&ord=dt (last visited Apr. 2, 2006). 
67
  Notably, the Cartagena Protocol excludes living modified organism (“LMO”) commodities that 
will be directly used as foods, feed or processing, LMOs in transit, and LMOs bound for contained use 
(e.g., organisms intended for scientific research in a laboratory).  IPGRI, supra note 38, at 72. 
68
  Parties to the CBD/Cartagena Protocol, supra note 63.  The Philippines Constitution states that the 
Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of International Law as part of the laws of the land.”  
CONST. (1987) § 2, art. II, (Phil.).  Treaties must receive a two-thirds approval vote from the Senate in 
order to be valid and effective.  Id. § 21, art. VII (Phil.). 
69
  Cartagena Protocol, supra note 31, pmbl. 
70
  Id. arts. 7-10. 
71
  See, e.g., Philippe Sands, Introduction to GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW xxxiii (Philippe Sands 
ed., 1994); Schnier, supra note 45, at 412; Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All?  A Comment 
on the Comparison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 207, 211 
(2003). 
72
  Laurence Graff, The Precautionary Principle, in The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: 
Reconciling Trade in Biotechnology with Environment & Development? 410 (Christoph Bail et al. eds., 
2002) [hereinafter Reconciling Trade]. 
73
  ALTIERI, supra note 2, at 55. 
74
  See, e.g., Elizabeth Duall, A Liability and Redress Regime for Genetically Modified Organisms 
Under the Cartagena Protocol, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 173, 182-85 (2004); de Leon et al., supra 
note 27, at 10-11; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF OCEANS & INT’L ENVT’L AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, 
FACT SHEET: CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY, Mar. 8, 2004, available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/fs/2004/28621.htm. 
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In contrast to the precautionary approach of the Cartagena Protocol, 
the WTO’s SPS Agreement is a more substantial threshold because it relies 
on the need for scientific proof in risk assessments.75  The SPS Agreement 
focuses on preventing the misuse of phytosanitary regulations as a barrier to 
trade.76  While it encourages members to be consistent with international 
standards, it does allow higher phytosanitary standards if there is scientific 
justification for the higher standard, which requires members to perform risk 
assessments.77  Thus, the SPS Agreement “threatens to preclude developing 
countries from banning or restricting the importation of genetically modified 
seeds.”78  It does not single out GMOs as an item to be regulated, but if they 
pose a scientifically-justified threat to biosafety in an importing country, 
then the SPS Agreement would apply to any relevant national sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures.79  Major exporters of GM crops, such as the United 
States, Canada, and Argentina, apply conventional, science-based risk 
assessments to GM products.80  In contrast, many European Union countries 
have adopted a “no risk” approach, which entails strict import measures that 
guarantee that importing countries maintain a high level of health and 
environmental protection.81 
A fundamental, philosophical conflict exists between the SPS 
Agreement and the Cartagena Protocol.82  The SPS Agreement requires 
scientific justification for imposing higher standards on imported items, such 
as GM plant material, while the Cartagena Protocol only relies on the 
precautionary principle, which does not require scientific justification.83  
Further, the Cartagena Protocol takes socio-economic considerations into 
                                           
75
  Denise M. Lietz, Comment, A Precautionary Tale: The International Trade Implications of 
Regulating Genetically Modified Foods in Australia and New Zealand, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 441, 
423-24 (2001). 
76
  Phytosanitary regulations aim to:  (1) protect agricultural crops from disease vectors such as 
viruses, bacteria, and fungi, and (2) prevent alien invasive species from disrupting natural ecosystems.  
Before the application of biotechnology to agricultural products, nations protected their crops from these 
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account,84 while the SPS Agreement does not.85  The major GM exporting 
countries have expressed apprehension that countries relying on the 
precautionary principle will use socio-economic reasons to justify a ban on 
GM products, an action that could lead to a trade conflict.86 
B. The Philippines Regulates GM Crops Through Executive and 
Administrative Regulations 
The Philippines’ rules and policies that specifically address the 
potential effects of agro-biotechnology on the environment are:  (1) 
Executive Order No. 430,87 which created the National Committee on 
Biosafety of the Philippines (“NCBP”), and (2) the Department of 
Agriculture’s Administrative Order No. 8 (“Administrative Order No. 8”), 
which is titled the “Rules and Regulations for the Importation and Release 
into the Environment of Plants and Plant Products Derived from the Use of 
Modern Biotechnology.”88 
1. The National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines Provides 
Technical Recommendations Regarding Biotechnology 
The National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines (“NCBP”) is 
a technical advisory body with a central role in regulating biotechnology. 
Created in 1990 by Executive Order No. 430, the NCBP was the Philippine 
government’s earliest effort to regulate biotechnology.89  The NCBP is a 
multi-disciplinary, inter-agency body attached to the Philippine 
government’s Department of Science and Technology.90  Its functions 
include identifying potential hazards involved in genetic engineering 
experiments, formulating and reviewing national policies and guidelines on 
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biosafety and risk assessments, developing working arrangements with the 
NCBP-member government agencies, developing technical expertise and 
facilities, and holding public deliberations on proposed national policies.91  
The NCBP is chaired by the Undersecretary for Research & Development of 
the Department of Science and Technology, and is composed of:  one 
biological scientist, one environmental scientist, one physical scientist, one 
social scientist, two “respected members of the community,” and one 
representative each from the Departments of Agriculture, Environment and 
Natural Resources, and Health.92 
The NCBP has developed risk assessment guidelines for contained use 
(laboratory or greenhouse use) and field tests of genetically modified plants.  
The first version of the Philippine National Biosafety Guidelines was 
published in 1991 and established that the NCBP must review and approve 
any work covered by the Guidelines.93  In 1998, the NCBP released a second 
edition of the Guidelines (“NCBP Guidelines”), which divided the 
Guidelines into three monographs, one of which specifically addresses the 
planned release of GMOs and potentially harmful exotic species.94  Under 
these guidelines, all institutions engaged in genetic engineering must 
establish an Institutional Biosafety Committee (“IBC”), which will evaluate 
and monitor the biosafety aspects of their activities.95  An IBC must be 
composed of at least five members, at least three of which must be 
“scientist-members” and at least two of which must be “community 
representatives” not affiliated with the institution.96 
2. The Philippine Department of Agriculture’s Bureau of Plant Industry 
Regulates the Release of GM Crops 
Regulatory authority over field release of GM crops is split between 
the Philippine Department of Agriculture, the Department of Environment 
and Natural Resources, and the Department of Health.97  In 2002, the 
Department of Agriculture promulgated Administrative Order No. 8,98 which 
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requires a risk assessment before releasing any plant or plant products 
derived from the use of modern biotechnology99 into the environment100 and 
establishes guidelines for using GM crops for contained use, field testing, 
propagation, and for feed, food, or processing.  Administrative Order No. 8 
also represents the Department of Agriculture’s attempt to conform to the 
risk assessment principles in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.101 
A sub-division of the Department of Agriculture, the Bureau of Plant 
Industry (“BPI”), is responsible for acting on the risk assessment guidelines 
outlined in Administrative Order No. 8.  The BPI’s authority derives from 
the Philippine Plant Quarantine Law of 1978,102 which includes a penalty 
clause that subjects violators to fines not in excess of 20,000 pesos or 
imprisonment or both.103  The BPI assures GM product safety through 
review by its Scientific and Technical Research Panel, which conducts a risk 
assessment prior to release of the product into the environment in order to 
determine whether the product poses significant risks to human health and 
the environment.104  If the regulated article passes the risk assessment, the 
BPI issues a biosafety permit, which could be for (1) import for contained 
use; (2) field testing; (3) propagation; or (4) import for direct use as food, 
feed, or processing.105   
IV. THE PHILIPPINES’ EXISTING BIOSAFETY REGULATIONS LACK 
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS AND FAIL TO COVER THE RANGE OF 
PROBLEMS POSED BY GM CROPS 
The Philippines currently relies on biosafety regulations and 
guidelines that lack enforcement power and do not cover the range of 
situations impacted by GM crops.  These deficiencies demonstrate the 
weakness of the Philippines’ existing biosafety regulatory framework. 
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A. The Philippines’ Biosafety Regulations Lack Adequate Enforcement 
Mechanisms 
The Philippines’ existing regulatory regime for biosafety—the NCBP 
Guidelines and Administrative Order No. 8—lacks enforcement power.  As 
an entity created by executive order rather than Congressional law, the 
NCBP itself has no regulatory function.  Acknowledging this limitation, the 
NCBP “deems itself a technical evaluation body; it reviews proposals for 
biotechnology application for the benefit of final approving bodies . . .” 
(e.g., the Department of Agriculture for agro-biotechnology applications).106  
The NCBP can impose sanctions and penalties for violators only through 
existing rules and regulations in the relevant regulatory agencies.107  The 
member agencies, in turn, do not have any laws or regulations that directly 
address agro-biotechnology.108  Further, penalties for violations are weak.  
For example, the Department of Agriculture’s Bureau of Plant Industry relies 
on the Plant Quarantine Law of 1978109 to regulate the field release of 
agricultural crops.110  The Plant Quarantine Law penalties include fines or 
imprisonment, at the court’s discretion.111  The fine cannot exceed 20,000 
pesos, which is only about US$370 and would not likely serve as a deterrent 
to transnational corporations.  The weak enforcement mechanisms and 
penalties of the Philippines’ existing regulatory regime for biosafety make it 
difficult for authorities to ensure GM crop cultivators are adequately 
protecting the environment. 
For each applicant who seeks to release GM crops into the 
environment, the NCBP Guidelines require an Institutional Biosafety 
Committee (“IBC”) to oversee compliance with the regulatory process.112   
The NCBP developed the IBC concept as a way to retain NCBP oversight 
over applicants in the face of limited NCBP funding.113  An IBC is 
responsible for evaluating project proposals; supervising, monitoring and 
reporting project progress to the NCBP; ensuring that the environment and 
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human health are protected; and informing surrounding communities of 
plans for environmental release of GM crops.114  Although an IBC has the 
“power to draft rules and regulations” to supplement the 1998 NCBP 
Guidelines,115 an IBC has no more enforcement authority than the NCBP, so 
such rules would merely support the purely advisory powers of the NCBP.  
Thus, any rules or regulations that an IBC develops would not provide 
adequate deterrence against possible violators.   
In a similar vein, although a majority of an IBC must endorse the 
project to the NCBP,116 the NCBP itself has no authority to halt a project, so 
the recommendations of an IBC are of little practical consequence.  The 
NCBP may withdraw its approval from a project,117 but it is the government 
agency that granted any applicable permit or license, and not the NCBP, that 
has the power to revoke the permit/license and destroy the GM crops.118  
When enforcing Administrative Order No. 8, the BPI does not have 
adequate regulatory authority to prevent violations.  The penalties available 
under Administrative Order No. 8 are revocation of the license or permit.119  
Further, much of the monitoring and reporting is voluntary for both the BPI 
and the parties growing GM crops.120  The BPI’s Plant Quarantine Officer 
“may inspect at any time the site where the regulated article is field 
tested,”121 but there are reports that such biosafety is not taken seriously122 
and that inspections are rare.123   
B. The Absence of a Single Regulatory Body with Enforcement Authority 
Hinders Compliance 
Two of the most common approaches to regulating biotechnology are 
to have specific legislation on GMOs or to expand the interpretation of 
existing laws.124  Australia uses specific legislation, while the United States 
uses administrative regulations adapted to address GMOs through existing 
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laws. 125  The Philippines’ current regulatory framework contains elements of 
both the United States and Australian approaches, but it should be remodeled 
to more closely match the Australian model.   
1. The Current Structure of the Philippine Agencies with a Role in 
Regulating GM Crops Impedes Compliance 
Lack of a single regulatory body to regulate biotechnology in the 
Philippines allows gaps in regulatory coverage and makes compliance 
problematic.  By cobbling together existing agencies to regulate the 
environmental release of GM crops, the Philippines’ current biosafety 
regulatory regime presents administrative challenges that leave many gaps in 
coverage and results in a decreased likelihood of compliance with the NCBP 
Guidelines.  Given the interdisciplinary nature of genetic modification of 
food products, it is inevitable that there will be jurisdictional overlap among 
the agencies involved. 
The sheer number of governmental agencies involved in attaining 
approval to release a GM crop presents dramatic administrative and 
coordination challenges.  The Philippine Departments of Agriculture, Health, 
Environment, Science and Technology, Trade and Industry, Economic 
Planning, and Foreign Affairs all have a role in the oversight of issues 
related to biosafety.126  Each department is composed of several bureaus, 
many of which have a role in regulating agro-biotechnology.  For example, 
when Monsanto, a major transnational agricultural business based in the 
United States, applied for a commercial permit for distribution of Bt corn, 
the following agencies within the Department of Agriculture were involved:  
the Bureau of Plant Industry, the Bureau of Animal Industry, the Bureau of 
Agricultural and Fisheries Products Standards, and the Fertilizer and 
Pesticide Authority.127  Under the NCBP Guidelines, the IBC for a project is 
responsible for ensuring “that all relevant regulatory agencies have been 
consulted” and that the “necessary permits, licenses or approvals have been 
obtained before any planned release is made.”128  While Monsanto’s IBC 
presumably fulfilled its duties, the regulatory structure unwisely relies on 
IBCs to ensure that GM crop cultivators obtain all the necessary permits.  As 
discussed in Part IV.A, the NCBP Guidelines implemented by an IBC have 
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no enforcement authority other than that provided by the mandates of the 
NCBP member agencies.     
Another problem with regulating GM crops through a network of 
existing agencies is that gaps in regulatory coverage will inevitably result.  A 
striking gap in the Philippines’ existing biosafety regulatory regime is that 
there are no specific roles for the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources and the Department of Health to monitor impacts to the 
environment and human health during field release of GM crops.129  The 
NCBP Guidelines specify that the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources is responsible for monitoring environmental impacts130 and that 
the Department of Health is responsible for monitoring the effects on human 
health,131 yet neither agency has regulatory authority or funding to conduct 
such monitoring.132   
Gaps in regulatory coverage are a particularly acute problem with 
biotechnology, because technology develops faster than the laws governing 
it.  For example, the Philippines’ existing regulatory scheme for agro-
biotechnology appears to have been designed only for situations in which 
GM crops are grown for consumption.  However, the “next wave” in agro- 
biotechnology is “biopharming,” which is the genetic engineering of plants 
to grow pharmaceuticals, antibodies, and industrial enzymes.133  
Biopharming poses more serious risks to human health and the environment 
than crops intended for consumption.134  Consequently, regulation of 
biopharming in the Philippines would require much more involvement from 
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and the Department 
of Health.  The Department of Health would need to evaluate the adverse 
health impacts that could result from human consumption of plants growing 
biopharm products.  However, the existing biosafety framework does not 
provide for such extensive participation from the Department of Health.  If 
an organization intended to pursue biopharming in the Philippines, such gaps 
in the regulatory regime would be exposed and could lead to harmful results.   
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2. The Philippines’ Approach to Regulating Biotechnology Shares Key 
Flaws with the United States’ Regulatory Framework and Should Be 
Modified to More Closely Resemble the Australian Regulatory Model 
The Australian “specific legislation” model for regulating 
biotechnology is more effective than the “existing legislation” approach the 
United States utilizes.  The United States’ biotechnology regulatory 
framework does not have a single regulatory authority with enforcement 
authority,135 and simultaneously has been heavily criticized for its 
ineffectiveness.136  In the United States, regulatory authority over GM crops 
is shared mostly by three federal agencies, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”), the Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), and the Food 
and Drug Administration (“FDA”).137  In 1986, the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy drafted the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of 
Biotechnology.138  This framework is based on the philosophy that GM crops 
are substantially similar to conventional crops,139 and thus their safety can be 
assured by existing regulations.140  Accordingly, the EPA and USDA are 
involved before GM crops can be produced commercially, and thus regulate 
the environmental release of plants derived from agro-biotechnology.141  
Separate from the EPA and the USDA, the FDA regulatory authority only 
applies to the marketing of GM crops as food for humans and animals.142  
Each agency regulates under the authority of other relevant federal statutes, 
each with its own mission and regulatory structure, none of which were 
enacted to address biotechnology.143  The United States’ overlapping 
approach has been criticized for being convoluted and ineffective.144  
Relying on separate regulations for the agricultural and the environmental 
aspects of biotechnology increases the complexity of the regulatory 
systems145 and allows the agencies to divide regulation of GM crops in an 
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illogical manner.146  In sum, despite the existence of the Coordinated 
Framework to encourage coordination, the United States’ regulations have 
proven to be under-inclusive.  
In contrast, Australia has one agency that oversees all GMO-related 
issues,147 an approach that is more efficient and comprehensive than the 
United States’ system.  The Australian Gene Technology Act consolidates all 
regulation of GMOs and GM products and established the Office of the 
Gene Technology Regulator (“OGTR”) to oversee implementation of the 
law.148  The OGTR issues GMO licenses, prepares risk assessment and risk 
management plans, develops policies and codes of practice, and provides 
advice to the public, other regulatory agencies and the Ministerial 
Council.149  The Gene Technology Act establishes a scientific committee, a 
community committee, and an ethics committee to provide advice upon 
request to the OGTR and Ministerial Council.150  Funneling all regulatory 
functions through the OGTR decreases potential problems regarding 
coordination and confusing overlaps in jurisdiction.   
The Philippines’ NCBP is a step toward having a centralized regulator 
like the Australian OGTR, but the current Philippine administrative 
framework is too weak to be effective because the NCBP lacks enforcement 
authority over the agencies with legal authority over biotechnology matters.  
Such reliance on existing authority to regulate biotechnology is similar to the 
United States’ system, and should be strengthened. 
V. STRONG BIOSAFETY LAWS WILL ENABLE THE PHILIPPINES TO BETTER 
PROTECT ITS ENVIRONMENT FROM THE DANGERS POSED BY GM CROPS  
The Philippines should strengthen its domestic biosafety laws in order 
to better protect the environment from transgenes that could escape from 
GM crops.  Legislation from the Philippine Congress is necessary to provide 
the adequate enforcement authority and funding to the agencies that must 
implement biosafety laws.  Such legal authority would bring the Philippines 
into compliance with the Cartagena Protocol, although the country may not 
benefit by formally ratifying the Protocol due to the potential adverse effects 
on trade and economic issues.  
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A. The Philippines Should Enact Congressional Legislation to Centralize 
and Strengthen Enforcement for Regulation of GM Crops 
As a long-term strategy, the Philippines should enact legislation that 
centralizes and strengthens regulatory authority over GM crops.  A statutory 
mandate in the form of a Republic Act (Philippine Congressional legislation) 
is necessary in order to provide enforcement power and funding for the 
agencies tasked with regulating GM crops.   
As an initial matter, enacting congressional legislation specific to 
biosafety—rather than regulating through existing authority—represents 
tacit acceptance of the philosophy that products of biotechnology should be 
regulated differently than identical products created through conventional 
means.151  Although some biotechnological processes alter genomes in ways 
that could have occurred without biotechnology,152 it is only the applications 
that could not have occurred naturally that warrant specialized legislation.153  
However, because this distinction would be burdensome to assess in 
practical applications, regulation of crops created through genetic 
modifications will necessarily be over-inclusive.  
A centralized agency with enforcement authority over biosafety would 
minimize gaps in regulatory coverage and increase compliance.  The 
Philippines already has a central biosafety entity—the National Committee 
on Biosafety of the Philippines—but as discussed supra in Part IV.B, the 
NCBP has only advisory authority.  Currently the NCBP merely indicates its 
approval of a project; bestowing actual permit-issuing authority would give 
its assessments more weight.  The NCBP should also have the power to halt 
projects. 
One gap that should be closed is the possibility that a thorough 
analysis of environmental impacts will not be taken prior to field release of 
GM crops.  In the United States, the Department of Agriculture’s Animal and 
Plant Health Inspection Service rarely requires preparation of an 
Environmental Impact Statement prior to approving a biopharm field,154 
indicative of the regulatory gap critics have identified regarding 
environmental impacts of biopharming.155  Analogously, there is currently no 
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regulatory trigger for the Philippine Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources (“DENR”) to conduct an environmental impact assessment for the 
field release of GM crops.156  The NCBP Guidelines establish that DENR 
“shall be responsible for monitoring the environmental effects of the planned 
release.”157  However, DENR itself has no explicit mandate to be involved 
with GM crops,158 as crops are deemed to be an agricultural issue within the 
purview of the Department of Agriculture.159  A related assurance that 
environmental impacts were being adequately addressed could be provided 
by more robust public participation requirements, which could be enforced 
by a central agency but performed at the local level.  Public participation 
supported by the threat of penalty would be an improvement over the 
minimum requirements currently dictated by the NCBP Guidelines and 
Administrative Order No. 8.160 
To improve the likelihood of compliance, the legislation should 
include stricter penalties than merely revoking a permit or license.  Lessons 
from countries, such as the United States, that have been growing GM crops 
for longer than the Philippines reveal the flaws of relying on voluntary 
compliance.161   
Inclusion of a provision in the biosafety legislation establishing 
liability for environmental harms is unnecessary and would drastically 
reduce the likelihood of the legislation’s enactment.  Given the Philippine 
Congress’ reluctance to ratify the Cartagena Protocol, it is doubtful it would 
pass any laws establishing liability for environmental harms caused by GM 
crops.  Countries with well-established GM crop sectors, such as the United 
States, rely on common law civil liability to remedy harms.162  Legal 
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theories that might apply include negligence, negligence per se, strict 
liability in tort, trespass, private nuisance, and public nuisance.163 
B. The Factors For and Against Philippine Ratification of the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety Balance Each Other 
The Philippines is under pressure from international and domestic 
forces to ratify the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, but on balance, the 
considerations supporting and opposing ratification are roughly equal. 
Enacting domestic biosafety legislation is the most important action the 
Philippines should take to protect its environment from the potential dangers 
of GM crops.  Doing so will bring the Philippines closer into compliance 
with the Cartagena Protocol, but not threaten the foreign trade or investment 
interests that the Philippines depends on to improve its national economy.     
A factor supporting ratification of the Cartagena Protocol is the 
likelihood that doing so would help the Philippines strengthen human and 
institutional capacities in biosafety.  Article 22 of the Protocol describes the 
methods through which parties can improve their capacity.164  Capacity-
building is an important aspect of improving compliance, as penalties cannot 
be imposed unless the implementing agency has the capacity to discover 
violations and enforce fines.165   
Further, the Philippines already appears to partially support the 
Cartagena Protocol.  During negotiations of the Cartagena Protocol, the 
Philippines belonged to the “Like-Minded Group” negotiating bloc, which 
comprised most of the developing countries.166  The Like-Minded Group 
sought a broad scope for the Cartagena Protocol and wanted it to supersede 
other international agreements.167  They were also concerned that 
“unregulated use of GMOs would threaten the sustainable use of their 
biodiversity.”168  In addition, the Philippines’ executive agencies claim that 
the existing Philippine biosafety guidelines are consistent with the risk 
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assessment procedure provided in the Cartagena Protocol169 (although 
statements from agency officials indicate that in practice the agencies act on 
science-based risk assessment principles,170 more similar to the SPS 
Agreement).  The government has stated that it believes GM crops to be 
safe,171 thus not requiring additional regulation.   
On the other hand, the Philippines faces the possibility that ratification 
of the Cartagena Protocol may jeopardize economic development 
opportunities from international corporations.172  A key factor is that the 
United States, the Philippines’ most important trading partner, is not bound 
by the Cartagena Protocol;173 this is very likely a contributing reason why 
the Philippine Senate has not yet ratified the Protocol.  In addition, it does 
not seem likely that the Philippines will ratify the Cartagena Protocol in the 
near future.174  There are reports that the Philippines’ Senate Committee on 
Foreign Affairs has not yet deliberated on the Protocol’s ratification175 and 
that the Chairman of the Philippine Senate Committee on Agriculture 
believes the Philippines should not ratify the Cartagena Protocol because the 
United States has not done so.176 
Understandably, the Philippine government’s priority is economic 
development and it is unlikely to take any actions that might threaten 
international investment in the Philippine economy.177  The government 
views GM crops as an approach to improving domestic food security and the 
livelihoods of farmers.178  However, in setting domestic policies regarding 
the regulation of agro-biotechnology, the Philippines, like many other 
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developing countries, is heavily influenced by its foreign trading partners.179  
The United States, in particular, wields significant influence on the 
Philippines.  From 1898 until 1946, the United States controlled the 
Philippines, and subsequently the countries maintained close economic 
ties.180  Today, the United States makes its wishes known on the economic 
front, as it is the Philippines’ most important trading partner and largest 
foreign investor.181  In turn, the United States is the Philippines’ top export 
market; approximately one-third of all Philippine exports are to the United 
States.182  Further, the United States is the world’s most significant exporter 
of GM crops (accounting for 59% of the global production), and in 2004, the 
Philippines was the United States’ 16th largest export market for agricultural 
products.183  Thus, the United States has an economic interest in ensuring the 
openness of markets for its agricultural products, which increasingly 
comprise GM foods, and the Philippines is one of those markets.  From the 
Philippines’ perspective as a net importer of grains,184 it is reluctant to 
alienate its trading partners that supply those grains.  The Philippines is also 
reluctant to jeopardize international investment,185 as the nation faces 
significant domestic economic challenges, including a national debt 
constituting 78% of the GDP.186  The government is attempting to increase 
revenue, but domestic political uncertainty has hampered those efforts, 
resulting in one of the lowest economic growth rates in the region and 
decreases in foreign investment.187  The Philippines is pursuing Bt corn to 
meet the shortfall in corn and corn substitutes, which the Philippine feed 
industry depends on.188  Thus, the Philippines has compelling economic 
reasons for following the United States’ lead on GM policies. 
However, the Philippines has other trading partners as well, many of 
which are parties to the Cartagena Protocol.  As of April 2, 2006, 132 
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countries were parties to the Protocol,189 including many of the United 
States’ current trading partners.  The Protocol states that trade of living 
modified organisms between parties and non-parties must be consistent with 
the Protocol.190  The United States Department of State acknowledges that 
non-parties who wish to export to parties must abide by the importing 
country’s domestic regulations191 and the United States purports to be 
support practical and effective implementation of the Cartagena Protocol.192  
There is strength in numbers and the more countries that accede to the 
Protocol, the closer the international community will be to having binding 
standards for minimizing the environmental risks posed by GM crops.193  
Harmonization over standards and terms in legislation is an important step in 
resolving potential trade disputes.194   
In analyzing whether the Philippines should ratify the Cartagena 
Protocol, it would be helpful to examine the economic ramifications of other 
developing nations and island countries in the Pacific Rim with economic 
similarities to the Philippines that have either signed or not signed the 
Cartagena Protocol.  However, given the Philippines’ colonial history with 
Spain and later the United States, the Philippines is unique.  It is also too 
early to see economic ramifications of other countries’ decisions regarding 
the Cartagena Protocol, as the Protocol entered into force so recently (in 
2003).  Yet, Thailand’s experience with GM crops may be instructive.  In 
2005, Monsanto threatened to halt its GM corn production in Thailand 
unless the Thai government lifted its ban on open field trials and the 
commercialization of transgenic crops.195  Thailand is a party to the 
Cartagena Protocol, and this incident reveals that taking too cautious a 
stance on GM crops can jeopardize foreign investment. 
The precautionary principle, a critical feature of the Cartagena 
Protocol, has resulted in an unexpected phenomenon among many 
developing countries’ policies regarding GM crops.196  Given the lower 
priority developing countries usually assign to environmental protection and 
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their simultaneous need to increase food production, one would expect 
developing countries to have relatively permissive biosafety policies, but 
that is not the case.197  Professor Robert Paarlberg has attributed the cautious 
GM crop policies in developing countries to an array of international 
influences, including non-governmental organizations from industrial 
countries objecting to GM crops as part of an agenda against globalization 
and the prospect of consumer skepticism toward GM crops in export markets 
in other countries.198  He further attributes cautious GM crop policies to the 
Cartagena Protocol, which encourages caution on biosafety approvals and 
“implicitly likens the transboundary shipment of GM organisms to the 
international shipment of hazardous waste.”199  Other critics of the 
precautionary principle observe that it does not consider the benefits of a 
complete array of risks, thus rendering incomplete the comparison between 
the new technology and the current practice.200  In so doing, the 
precautionary principle prevents a technology from steadily progressing 
toward the reduction of risks by halting it if the first uses of the technology 
are “not perfect.”201  Since the Philippines is pursuing GM crops to benefit 
national food security, an overly cautious policy regarding biosafety may 
delay the expected benefits of GM crop technology, thus defeating the 
purpose. 
C. The Philippines Should Adopt the Draft National Biosafety 
Framework As a Temporary Measure to Improve Biosafety 
The Protected Areas and Wildlife Bureau of the Philippines’ 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources has drafted a National 
Biosafety Framework (“Draft Framework”)202 that would improve 
environmental protection by increasing coordination between the agencies 
that regulate GM crops.  With the assistance of the United Nations 
Environment Programme, the Protected Areas and Wildlife Bureau 
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conducted a multi-year project to determine how the Philippines could best 
prepare to conform its domestic laws with the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety203 should the nation choose to ratify the Protocol.204  The end 
product was a draft Executive Order prescribing guidelines for the 
implementation of the Framework and strengthening the NCBP.205 
The Draft Framework consolidates existing “policies, laws, and 
administrative issues related to modern biotechnology and biosafety” into an 
integrated framework that increases “clarity, transparency, and predictability 
[in] decision-making,” seeks to avoid jurisdictional conflicts, and facilitates 
public consensus.206  For instance, the Draft Framework lays out which 
administrative agency shall take the lead on enumerated GMO scenarios and 
it also directs the NCBP to designate an agency when a GMO does not fall 
under the jurisdiction of one of the enumerated agencies.207  Further, it seeks 
to ensure that agencies other than the Department of Agriculture also 
participate in monitoring and enforcement when necessary; the Framework 
proposes to accomplish this by attaching monitoring conditions to approvals 
and authorizations.208  
The Southeast Asia Regional Initiatives for Community 
Empowerment (“SEARICE”), a non-profit group based in the Philippines, 
has criticized the Draft Framework for not designating the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources as the sole lead agency responsible for 
implementation of the Draft Framework.  SEARICE recommends that the 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources manage the Draft 
Framework, since it is already the lead agency for the Convention on 
Biodiversity.209  SEARICE also argues that the Framework does not resolve 
the problems in administrative efficiency and flexibility inherent in the 
existing biosafety regulations, noting that coordination between the NCBP 
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and the Bureau of Plant Industry (“BPI”) is particularly troublesome.210  
However, it is unclear why coordination between the NCBP and the 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources would be smoother.  The 
NCBP is better situated to coordinate the regulatory agencies.  It occupies a 
more independent position as it is attached to the Department of Science and 
Technology.  Further, retaining the BPI in an important role makes sense 
because, as a bureau within the Philippine Department of Agriculture, it is 
better equipped to balance hypothetical biosafety risks from GM crops 
against the Philippines’ actual food production needs.211   
The drafters of the Draft Framework correctly acknowledge its 
limitations as a long-term solution.212  However, despite the criticisms from 
SEARICE, the Draft Framework is worth implementing for the clarification 
it provides regarding the roles of the various administrative agencies in 
regulating agro-biotechnology, which helps fill some of the gaps left by the 
existing regulatory regime. 
D. Enacting Stronger Biosafety Laws Would Contribute to Building 
Public Support for GM Crops  
Ensuring strong environmental protection is one aspect of improving 
public confidence in GM crops, which are currently beleaguered by volatile 
protests.  Further, increasing public confidence in the Philippine 
government’s ability to regulate the environmental impacts of GM crops is 
an important step toward building the acceptance GM crops need in order to 
have any kind of impact on food security, which is the Philippine 
government’s purpose for embracing the technology.   
There are groups that oppose GM crops for reasons other than their 
potential to disrupt ecosystems through the flow of transgenes.213 Several 
farmers’ groups and non-governmental organizations do not want the 
Philippines to become dependent on foreign transnational companies for 
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seeds and other agricultural needs.214  Improving environmental protection 
would do little to sway these groups that GM crops should be embraced.  
However, public opinion polls indicate that the majority of consumers in 
Asia are open-minded, albeit cautious, about GM crops.215  A precautionary 
approach to regulating GM crops would appeal to those populations who 
might otherwise support GM crops.  Commentators have noted that with the 
introduction of new technologies, “low-certainty, low-consensus” risk 
situations can be expected, but as time passes those situations have the 
potential to move into higher levels of consensus.216  In low-certainty, low-
consensus situations, public input “assumes even greater social and scientific 
importance.”217 
A challenge in building public approval of GM crops is that a public 
relations battle is being fought by both sides.  An infamous example is how 
frequently anti-GMO groups cite the 2000 discovery of transgenes from GM 
maize in the genomes of traditional maize varieties in Mexico.  However, the 
scientific method from the original test was suspect, and when the 
confirming survey was conducted in 2004, the scientists found no 
transgenes.218  Within the Philippines, there have been conflicting reports 
about the success of Bt corn.219  The Philippine government frequently touts 
Bt corn as an example of how the existing biosafety guidelines are 
functioning properly.  However, even if Bt corn is safe, that does not mean 
all GM crops in the future will be.  Each genetic transformation event and 
each modified species will behave differently in the field.220  Thus, it is 
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crucial to have reliable biosafety procedures in place to properly address 
future unknowns.   
It should be noted that biosafety regulations should not be 
strengthened merely to improve public confidence.221  One side-effect of 
over-regulation is that only large multi-national growers will be able to 
afford the cost of complying, which could contribute to the current trend of 
consolidating control of agriculture into corporate hands.222 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The potential benefits of GM crops, such as the possibility of 
increased yield and reduced use of pesticides, make the technology 
worthwhile to pursue, albeit with caution.  Although there are still protests of 
GM crops and there may be compelling social or economic reasons not to 
pursue the technology, from the scientific perspective regarding 
environmental risks from gene flow from GM crops, proceeding with 
caution and adhering to a comprehensive, enforceable legal regime is the 
best approach.  The Philippines’s existing agro-biotechnology regulations 
are weak, but would be improved by adopting the temporary fix 
encompassed in the Draft Biosafety Framework and, most importantly, 
binding legislation in the form of a Republic Act. 
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